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Leji, Sun was, apart from being “steadfast in politics 
and rich in leadership experience,” “familiar with party 
affairs and economic work.” Zhao also praised Sun for 
having “broad perspectives” on a wide range of  issues 
of  governance (Chongqing Daily [Chongqing], December 
21; China News Service, December 21). 
Hu Chunhua, who took over from the reformist Politburo 
member Wang Yang as Guangdong party secretary 
in mid-December, is a veteran party functionary with 
scant exposure to areas such as finance, foreign trade 
or high technology. Having spent 19 years in Tibet and 
three years in Inner Mongolia, Hu has ample experience 
dealing with tough law-and-order situations, including 
defusing the anti-Beijing plots of  Tibetan and Mongolian 
separatists. It is doubtful, however, whether the fast-
rising star can satisfactorily accomplish the task, first set 
by predecessor Wang, of  turning the Pearl River Delta 
from “world factory” into a global innovation hub. It is 
perhaps significant that upon taking over his Guangdong 
job, Hu hewed to the CCP tradition of  giving top priority 
to establishing a trustworthy and combat-ready corps of  
cadres rather than reforming institutions and systems of  
governance. “We must put together a [ruling] team that is 
united, capable, influential and full of  combative [spirit],” 
the Hubei-born Hu told local officials (Guangzhou 
Daily [Guangzhou], December 19; China News Service, 
December 19).  
It is unique to China that almost all members of  its top 
ruling council, the CCP Politburo Standing Committee 
(PBSC), since the end of  the Cultural Revolution are 
former party secretaries of  provinces, autonomous 
regions or directly administered cities. Amongst the seven 
newly-appointed PBSC members, only Liu Yunshan, 
who is in charge of  the CCP Secretariat, has never been 
a provincial party boss. As the mass-circulation Global 
Times put it in a commentary, provincial party secretaries 
constitute an elite “talent pool” for the CCP’s highest 
echelon. “It is the requirement of  the Chinese system 
that the provincial party secretary must have the ability 
to handle the full range of  [political] situations,” the 
paper said, “They need to have a large ‘magnetic field,” a 
sense of  authority and ability to project personal warmth. 
They must also have a very high level of  expertise and 
perceptiveness” (Global Times [Beijing], December 19). 
There seems little doubt that all the newly-elevated party 
secretaries—and to a considerable extent, governors—
have passed muster in terms of  tackling tough political 
challenges as well as abiding by Beijing’s instructions. The 
jury is still out, however, on the equally pivotal issue of  
whether they can break new ground in reform as General 
Secretary Xi pledged to do during his trip to Shenzhen in 
early December.
Willy Wo-Lap Lam, Ph.D., is a Senior Fellow at The Jamestown 
Foundation. He has worked in senior editorial positions in 
international media including Asiaweek newsmagazine, South 
China Morning Post and the Asia-Pacific Headquarters of  
CNN. He is the author of  five books on China, including the 
recently published Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao  Era:  New 
Leaders, New Challenges. Lam is an Adjunct Professor of  
China studies at Akita International University, Japan, and at the 
Chinese University of  Hong Kong.
***
What Direction for Legal Reform 
Under Xi Jinping?
By Carl Minzner
Hopes for reform in China have risen in recent weeks. Xi Jinping’s decision to make Shenzhen the 
site of  his first formal inspection tour as party general 
secretary spurred predictions that he will seek to assume 
Deng Xiaoping’s mantle as an economic reformer (“Xi 
Jinping’s ‘Southern Tour’ Reignites Promises of  Reform,” 
China Brief, December 14, 2012). Similarly, Xi’s speech 
regarding China’s need for the rule of  law—given on the 
30th anniversary of  the 1982 constitution—gave rise to 
press speculation that he may pursue legal and political 
reform (South China Morning Post, December 13, 2012; 
AFP, December 4, 2012).
Naturally, this comes against the background of  a 
conservative turn against legal reform by Chinese leaders 
in recent years [1]. Since 2005, party authorities have 
cooled on the rule-of-law discourse that characterized 
the late 1990s and early 2000s. Party political campaigns 
have warned Chinese judges and courts against 
foreign legal norms. Public interest lawyers have 
been subjected to increased pressure, harassment and 
periodic disappearances or torture. Moreover, under 
ChinaBrief  Volume XII  s  Issue 24 s  December 14, 2012
7
the leadership of  former party political-legal committee 
head and standing committee member, Zhou Yongkang, 
extralegal “stability maintenance” (weiwen) institutions 
have ballooned in size and influence. 
New language in official pronouncements now suggests 
Chinese leaders intend to reverse at least some of  these 
policies. This appears to be linked directly to internal party 
efforts to curb the power of  political-legal committees in 
the wake of  the Bo Xilai scandal (“Year-End Questions 
on Political-Legal Reform,” China Brief, December 14, 
2012). This shift has allowed activists some greater space 
to advocate for reforms to state practices, including 
the reeducation through labor (RETL) system. Central 
authorities, however, remain committed to maintaining 
party political control, rendering it unclear how far such 
legal reforms will be permitted to proceed.
Changes in Party Rhetoric
Ironically, some of  the key linguistic shifts have not 
originated (at least on the surface) from Xi himself. 
Rather, they came from former Party General Secretary 
Hu Jintao during the run-up to the November leadership 
handover.  
One such shift originated with Hu’s July 23 speech to 
ministerial and provincial heads. Attended by all of  the 
then-members of  Politburo Standing Committee and 
presided over by Xi, it was accompanied by an unusually 
high degree of  media coverage. At the time, the speech 
was widely viewed as an opportunity for top Chinese 
leaders to demonstrate their unity in the aftermath of  
Bo’s dismissal and publicly emphasize Xi’s role as the heir 
apparent in the political succession process, but lacking 
in substantive content regarding institutional reform 
(Reuters, July 24, 2012). This speech, however, appears to 
have introduced a new political phrasing (tifa), calling for 
authorities to “devote more attention…to the important 
uses of  rule of  law in national governance and social 
management (shehui zhili)” (People’s Daily, July 24, 2012). 
Since party political-legal authorities had employed “social 
management” as an umbrella term for the expansion of  
their activities in recent years, this new phrasing appears 
to be an implicit rebuke. It suggests that Chinese leaders 
may deploy rule-of-law norms strategically to curtail the 
power of  party political-legal authorities.
Further linguistic changes appeared in the 2012 work 
report delivered by Hu and drafted by Xi (“The 18th 
Party Congress Work Report: Policy Blueprint for the 
Xi Administration,” China Brief, November 30, 2012). 
Parallel passages of  the 17th and 18th Party Congress 
work reports also offer some hints of  reform: 
“Each party organization and all party members must 
self-consciously operate within the boundaries of  the 
constitution and the law, and must take the lead in 
upholding the authority of  the constitution and the 
law” (Xinhua, October 24, 2007).
“Since the party has led the people to promulgate 
the constitution and laws, the party must operate 
within the boundaries of  the constitution and laws. 
No organization and no individual are entitled to 
special powers exceeding the constitution and laws. 
It is absolutely impermissible for (any individual in 
power) to take their own words as law, to use power to 
suppress the law, or to bend the law for ones relatives 
or friends” (Xinhua, November 27, 2012) [2].
The 18th Party Congress Work Report has marginally 
stronger language that the party itself  is obligated to 
operate within the confines of  the constitution and laws. 
This, however, remains nuanced by the statement that 
the party itself  remains the originator of  both. Last, the 
final sentence clearly implied that this change in nuance 
is aimed at combating problems raised by recent scandals, 
such as the one surrounding former Chongqing Party 
Secretary Bo Xilai.
Yet a third example of  a change in rhetoric occurred 
in the White Paper on Judicial Reform released by the 
Information Office of  the State Council in October 2012 
(The Diplomat, October 13, 2012). Such documents 
(issued in 2008 and 2011 as well) serve a regular propaganda 
function, reeling off  state accomplishments in the field 
of  human rights. They also serve to transmit the officially 
approved political line regarding legal reform. 
For example, the 2011 white paper confirmed the shift 
away from pro-reform agenda of  earlier years. Rather 
than emphasizing the need to establish the “rule of  law,” 
it spoke of  building a “socialist legal system with Chinese 
characteristics.” Where the 2008 document spoke of  these 
efforts as a work in progress, the 2011 version stressed 
that these efforts were largely completed. It also deleted 
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discussion of  China’s efforts to engage in international 
legal cooperation in favor of  extensive rhetoric regarding 
the inapplicability of  foreign legal norms to China.
Now, the 2012 white paper marks a sharp break with 
the version issued just a year ago. The politicized 
language regarding a “socialist legal system with 
Chinese characteristics,” a hallmark in Party political-
legal pronouncements over recent years, has receded. 
The white paper clearly states that the current round 
of  legal reforms begun in 2008 (not coincidentally, 
the year that Wang Shengjun, the current conservative 
head of  the Supreme People’s Court, assumed office) is 
“basically finished.” Even more noteworthy, there is not 
a single reference in the entire document to the Chinese 
Communist Party.  
Of  course, it is important to not overstate the thrust 
of  the 2012 white paper. While it characterizes judicial 
reform as an integral part of  “institutional political 
reform” and states that it will continue to strengthen 
in the years to come, it gives no concrete suggestions 
as to how this will be carried out. It also clearly states 
that Chinese judicial reform will proceed from its own 
“national characteristics” and will not “copy” models 
from other countries. 
Nonetheless, the white paper does suggest that some 
Chinese leaders may seek to curb efforts of  party political-
legal organs to re-impose greater political controls on the 
Chinese judiciary in recent years. The paper also suggests 
there may be some openness to dealing with the issue of  
judicial and legal reform in a more objective manner.
Implications
Liberal intellectuals and reformist officials have sensed the 
shift in political winds. Many view the party political-legal 
apparatus as politically vulnerable now, following the fall 
of  Bo Xilai, central discontent with Zhou Yongkang’s role 
in the affair and subsequent central moves to downgrade 
the bureaucratic rank of  political-legal committees. 
Over the fall, this led to a rising tide of  criticism directed 
at the RETL system run by China’s security organs (New 
York Times, December 15, 2012). Used as a convenient 
tool to suppress prostitutes, petitioners, political dissidents 
and underground church members, this extrajudicial 
detention system has been linked to a range of  abuses 
against detainees. In August, journalists, academics and 
citizen activists seized on the case of  Tang Hui, a mother 
sentenced to a year and a half  in a labor camp after 
petitioning authorities in search of  heavier punishment 
for the men who allegedly kidnapped and raped her 
11-year old daughter. Tang’s case generated a surge 
of  sympathetic commentary on micro-blogging sites, 
resulting in her release by Chinese authorities seeking to 
appease popular sentiment (Guardian, August 16, 2012). 
Official commentary in state media appeared to indicate 
some central support for broader reform. For example, 
a November editorial in the People’s Daily criticized the 
RETL system as having devolved into a “tool for attacks 
and reprisals” by some officials and singled out the case 
of  Ren Jianyu, a local official in Chongqing sentenced 
to RETL in 2011 for his criticism of  Bo Xilai’s policies 
(People’s Daily, November 21, 2012). Liberal academics 
and activists have since merged their reform calls with 
these developments and some have pressed for the 
complete abolition of  the RETL system (t.163.com/
weifanghe, October 25, 2012).
Nor have they stopped there. Liberal critics have latched 
on to new language emanating from central authorities 
to push for yet deeper reforms. Academics and public 
interest lawyers have held conferences calling for 
judicial independence (Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, 
December 20, 2012). Jiang Ping, one of  the key figures 
involved in late 20th century legal reforms, has noted that 
Hu Jintao’s July 23rd speech has had a “positive effect,” 
but that emphasizing rule of  law remains “meaningless” 
absent political reform. Jiang specifically criticized hard-
line policies pursued by party political-legal authorities 
in recent years, including heavy emphasis on social 
stability, shifts away from efforts to professionalize the 
Chinese judiciary and promote court adjudication of  
citizen disputes according to law as well as the heavy use 
of  mediation ratios to evaluate Chinese judges (Hong 
Kong Commercial Daily, November 6, 2012). Similarly, 
constitutional law scholar Tong Zhiwei has called for 
central authorities to back up their statements on reform 
with meaningful action, separating party and state organs 
and creating mechanisms to supervise rights guaranteed 
in the constitution (Time Weekly, December 14, 2012).
Such calls for deeper legal and judicial reform face serious 
internal opposition. Supreme People’s Court President 
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Wang Shengjun, one of  the key figures responsible for 
recent hard-line policies in the court system, has retained 
his seat on the Central Committee. Joseph Fewsmith 
predicts Wang will follow the bureaucratic path of  his 
predecessor, Xiao Yang, and be permitted to serve until 
the 19th Party Congress in 2016 (China Leadership 
Monitor, No. 40, Forthcoming). Moreover, as of  late 
December, Wang himself  was continuing to reiterate 
key themes—such as the importance of  social stability 
considerations in handling cases and the overriding 
emphasis on mediation—that have been hallmarks of  
the conservative turn against legal reform in recent years 
(Xinhua, December 27, 2012). 
Additionally, prior experience suggests caution in 
evaluating the promise of  legal reform by new party 
leaders. Following Hu Jintao’s accession as party 
general secretary in 2002, the appointment of  moderate 
reformers to government posts and an increase in official 
rule-of-law rhetoric, domestic and foreign observers 
sensed Chinese authorities might be open to meaningful 
legal reform. This led to a surge of  activism by citizens, 
journalists and legal activists regarding an extralegal 
detention system (custody and repatriation) linked to 
the abuse and deaths of  detainees [3]. When the new 
party authorities abolished the system in 2003, many 
took this as a sign that China’s constitutional moment 
perhaps had dawned (“NPCSC: The Vanguard of  China’s 
Constitution?” China Brief, February 4, 2008). 
A decade later, however, it appeared that these hopes had 
been premature (“Constitutionalizing Wukan: The Value 
of  the Constitution Outside the Courtroom,” China Brief, 
February 3, 2012). Once the new party authorities had 
navigated successfully the domestic political transition, 
officials moved to curtail the judicial institutions, the 
rule-of-law rhetoric and the public interest lawyers that 
had marked the late Jiang and early Hu periods.  
So is the current bout of  reformist language a marker of  
real change or simply a transitory artifact of  party divisions 
arising from the fight over leadership succession? Since 
it remains highly unlikely that central authorities will 
announce the creation of  meaningful electoral or legal 
checks on party power, here are some other potential 
markers to watch over the coming year:
• Whether personnel reforms raise the bureaucratic 
profile of  the Chinese judiciary vis-à-vis that of  the 
public security organs; 
• Whether concrete performance evaluation 
measures facing local officials
• are altered, particularly the hard-line emphasis in 
recent years on maintaining social stability and 
controlling citizen petitioners;
• Whether the content of  official “model judge” 
propaganda campaigns—which has shifted in 
recent years away from an emphasis on judicial 
professionalism in favor of  revived Maoist 
populism—is altered to reflect the new language 
coming from the center;
• Whether official pressure and repression of  public 
interest lawyers is reduced. 
Carl Minzner is an associate professor at Fordham Law 
School specializing in China law and governance. Prior to 
entering academia, he served as Senior Counsel to the 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China.  He is the 
author of “China’s Turn Against Law” (American Journal 
of Comparative Law, 2011).
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